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Abstract Aphantasia is a recently discovered disorder characterised by the total
incapacity to generate visual forms of mental imagery. This paper proposes that
aphantasia raises important theoretical concerns for the ongoing debate in the
philosophy and science of consciousness over the nature of dreams. Recent studies
of aphantasia and its neurobehavioral correlates reveal that the majority of aphan-
tasics, whilst unable to produce visual imagery while awake, nevertheless retain the
capacity to experience rich visual dreams. This finding constitutes a novel
explanandum for theories of dreaming. Specifically, I argue that the recent dream
reports of aphantasics constitute an empirical challenge to the emerging family of
views which claim that dreams are essentially imaginative experiences, constitu-
tively involving the kinds of mental imagery which aphantasics, ex-hypothesi, lack.
After presenting this challenge in the context of Jonathan Ichikawa’s recent argu-
ments for this view, I argue that this empirical challenge may be overcome if the
imagination theorist abandons Ichikawa’s account of dreaming in favour of a
modified version. This involves the claim that dreams are essentially inactive and
constitutively involve non voluntary forms of imagination. I conclude with a sug-
gestion for further research which can test the viability of this alternative hypoth-
esis, and move the debate forward.
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1 What are dreams?
An emerging debate in the philosophy and science of consciousness concerns the
nature and ontological status of dreams. Much discussion has focused on solving
what Jennifer Windt (2015) calls the ‘‘conceptualisation problem’’: how, if at all,
ought we to account for dreaming using the standard psychological terms (such as
perception, hallucination, thought and emotion) used to characterise wakeful
consciousness? According to one growing family of views, dreams are best
understood in ontic terms as instances of imaginative experiences. The so-called
‘imagination model of dreaming’ has been influentially developed by Jonathan
Ichikawa (2009, 2016), who argues that dreams constitutively involve both sensory
and propositional forms of imagination. In addition to conceptual lines of argument,
Ichikawa maintains that the imagination model of dreaming receives considerable
support from various forms of neuropsychological evidence which suggest dream
imagery and waking imagery share a common neural basis (Solms 1997; Foulkes
1999).
Here, I present an empirical case against the imagination model of dreaming as
presented by Ichikawa (2009, 2016). I analyse a series of recent neurological studies
which identify a particularly pure case of imagery generation disorder known as
aphantasia (Zeman et al. 2015, 2016). Subjects with aphantasia—‘aphantasics’—
are characterised not just as having mental imagery of a reduced vividness, or the
incapacity to produce imagery of certain visual kinds, but as lacking the capacity or
power to produce visual forms of mental imagery altogether. Whilst the recent
findings on aphantasia have previously been considered in relation to the ongoing
‘imagery debate’ in cognitive science which concerns the nature of mental imagery
and its cognitive function (Zeman et al. 2015; Kosslyn et al. 2006), the full
theoretical significance of aphantasia and its implications for debates about the
nature of dreaming have yet to be considered. Bolstered by the fact that these
preliminary studies of aphantasia reveal that the condition can be both acquired
(Zeman et al. 2010) as well as a lifelong stable condition (Zeman et al. 2015, 2016),
this paper starts from the claim that subjects with aphantasia and their dream reports
provide an interesting test case for philosophers and psychologists who posit a tight
ontological connection between dream mentation and sensory forms of imagination.
The plan for the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 outline Ichikawa’s
imagination model of dreaming (2009, 2016) and the empirical case offered in
support of it. Section 4 introduces the recent studies on aphantasia and the
notable neurobehavioural features of the condition that these highlight. In Sect. 5 I
bring these together and argue that the dream reports of aphantasic subjects recorded
to date present an empirical challenge to the imagination model of dreaming
presented by Ichikawa. My argument, which results in a dilemma for Ichikawa, is
based on the following claims: (i) Ichikawa is committed to the claim that dreams
often involve visual forms of mental imagery—which he characterises as essentially
agential phenomena—as central and constitutive components, (ii) that aphantasic
subjects ex hypothesi lack the capacity for these kinds of agential experiences and
(iii), that aphantasic subjects nevertheless report having rich visual dreams. Insofar
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as this goes against the predictions made by the imagination model, I argue that
these studies thus appear to disconfirm Ichikawa’s theory, and in doing so,
problematically lend support to alternative accounts which the imagination model
was meant to replace. In Sect. 6 I consider a way in which the proponent of the
imagination model can respond to this empirical challenge. The aphantasia studies
notably suggest a strong neurophysiological dissociation between voluntary and
involuntary forms of mental imagery, with only the capacity for the former being
lost by the majority of aphantasic subjects. I argue that the strongest response
available to the imagination theorist is to take up the recent calls for adoption of a
variation of the imagination model according to which non-lucid dreams essentially
involve involuntary, passive or inactive forms of imagination (O’Shaughnessy
2002; Soteriou 2017; Crowther 2018). I conclude in Sect. 7 with a discussion of the
broader implications of aphantasia for theories of dreaming. This includes a
proposal for future dream research which can shed light on the empirical viability of
this alternative model of dreaming, and move contemporary debate on the
conceptualisation question forward.
2 The imagination model of dreaming
The claim that dreams in some sense involve imaginative experiences leaves open a
number of more sophisticated ontological analyses of dreaming.1 Motivated by the
rejection of the orthodox alternative to the imagination view, which claims that
dreams are essentially hallucinations which involve misleading, wake-like sensory
experiences (or ‘percepts’) leading to false beliefs, Ichikawa’s formulation of the
imagination model of dreaming involves a commitment to two central claims2:
(i) Imagery: dreams essentially involve mental imagery—experiences of the
kind which occur when we imagine what something looks, feels, smells or
tastes like. ‘Imagery’ implies, for example, that when I dream of the white
cliffs of Dover, my experience is of the same kind as that which I have when I
close my eyes and imagine them in front of me when awake (and not, contra
the hallucination account, the same kind of experience I would have if I were
to visually perceive them). (2009, p.105).
1 Variations on this claim can be found, for example, in Sartre (1940), Walton (1990), O’Shaughnessy
(2002) McGinn (2004), Sosa (2005, 2007, 2009), Ichikawa (2009, 2016), Thompson and Batchelor
(2014), Soteriou (2013, 2017), Crowther (2018). The assumptions that dreams (a) are phenomenally
conscious experiences that occur during sleep and (b) that these are reported accurately upon waking have
not gone unquestioned—Malcolm (1956), Dennett (1976), Rosen (2013)—however they are now widely
accepted, and I do not press them here. A recent defense of these claims can be found in Windt and
Metzinger (2007) and Windt (2015)).
2 Versions of the hallucination model can be found in Descartes (1984), Hobson et al. (2003) and
Revonsuo (2005). Alternatives to hallucination and imagination accounts include the view that dreams
involve neither perceptual or imaginative experiences but are sui-generis immersive spatio-temporal
hallucinations (Windt 2010, 2015), and the pluralist thesis that dreams essentially involve multiple
different kinds of experience (Rosen 2012, 2019).
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And
(ii) Imaginings: the belief like states that we take towards the content of our
dreams (whilst dreaming) are instances of propositional imagination. ‘Imag-
inings’ implies that when I dream that I am swimming the English Channel, I
imagine that I am doing so; my dream does not involve my having the belief
that I am in fact swimming the English Channel (2009, 111).3
The viability of this now-standard contrast between the hallucination and
imagination models of dreaming depends on the acceptance of a number of
substantive philosophical assumptions about the nature of imagination, perception
and hallucination and the relations between them. Primarily, the presentation of the
hallucination and imagination models as mutually exclusive theories depends on the
presupposition that there is a difference in kind between imaginative phenomena on
the one hand and perceptual-hallucinatory experiences on the other. That is, it
requires acceptance of the view that there is a phenomenally determinable or
otherwise essential difference between the categories of imaginative and perceptual-
hallucinatory experiences, such that the two are considered distinct kinds of mental
phenomena. The rationale for this is as follows: if imaginative and perceptual-
hallucinatory experiences differ not in kind but in degree, as argued by Hume, then
plausibly there ceases to be a substantive disagreement between proponents of
imagination and hallucination theories of dreaming.4 Acceptance of this claim gives
rise to a second, crucial, observation: any theory which seeks to provide an analysis
of dreaming in terms of imagination needs to supplement this claim with a
philosophical account of what imagination is. That is, if it is to be properly
informative, an imagination model of dreaming ought to include within it an
account of what it is to be an imaginative experience, as opposed to a perceptual or
hallucinatory one. In addition to securing its status as a distinct mental kind from
perception and other cognitive phenomena, this must also have the resources to
accommodate the various commonalities and differences thought to hold between
the two.5 Ichikawa thus combines his endorsement of imagery and imaginings with
a further claim which serves as the final tenet of his theory:
(iii) Subject to the will: The crucial distinction between imagery and percepts
is to be made on the basis that the former is necessarily ‘‘subject to the will’’.
3 See Sinhababu (2016) for a discussion of how so-called propositional or attitudinal imagination, as a
distinct cognitive attitude, can be distinguished from belief.
4 Rosen (2019) includes a recent endorsement of this view. It is worth noting here that the vindication of
this set up not only requires that imaginative and perception differ in kind (Kriegel 2015), but also that
perceptual and hallucinatory experiences do not. That is, the dialectic here is further complicated by
certain disjunctivist theories of perception, which deny that veridical and hallucinatory experiences are of
the same fundamental kind (Martin 2004, 2006). This is particularly pertinent in light of the recent
attempt to provide a positive disjunctivist analysis of hallucination in terms of sensory forms of
imagination (Allen 2015). Again, on this view, hallucination and imagination models of dreaming would
amount to the same thesis.
5 See Nanay (2016) for the difficulties associated with this task.
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That is to say, imagination is fundamentally an agentive phenomenon (2009,
p. 106).
As a type of agentive theory, Ichikawa relies here upon the intuitive idea that the
generation or production of mental imagery, as opposed to perception, essentially
constitutes a mental act over which we have direct control. That is to say, the
inception and content of our visual imagery is typically determined by us;
experimental subjects can choose to visualise an apple as opposed to other pieces of
fruit, for example, when asked to ‘‘imagine a piece of fruit’’ or an ‘‘inanimate
object’’ in the lab. This is thought to contrast with the traditionally passive nature of
veridical or hallucinatory perception, over which we exercise little control. While
the agential nature of imaginings is well recognised, agentive theories claim not
only that the agential origin of imaginings is common to the majority of imaginative
episodes, but is rather constitutive of them. That is, that each and every imaginative
experience is such that it is necessarily subject to the agent’s will (2009; McGinn
2004).6
Does this commit Ichikawa to the implausible view that our dreams are under our
control, and relatedly, that there can be no instances of so-called ‘passive
imaginings’—unbidden mental images, or earworms? Whilst other agentive theories
of imagination, which differ in subtle ways from Ichikawa’s account, are clear in
their commitment to this latter claim—and thus are directly opposed to an analysis
of dreaming in terms of imagination—Ichikawa doesn’t think so.7 This is due to the
fact that Ichikawa claims there is a distinction to be made between an experience
having an agential origin or being ‘subject to the will’, and that same experience
being under an agent’s voluntary control. That is, he claims, following Wittgenstein
(1967):
it is possible for something to be subject to the will, and yet not ‘under
voluntary control’—the annoying song that runs through your head is an
example of something like this. It is subject to the will because it makes sense
to try to banish it; it is not under your voluntary control because you are
unable to succeed. We do not always voluntarily control the things we do; this
does not stop them from being things we do (2009, p. 116, italics added).
and,
Unwelcome imagery is more like an unwelcome habit or addiction than an
unwelcome set of chains….even when our imagery is unwelcome and we
cannot banish it, we can try to banish it; we know what it is to banish it. We
are failing to perform an act. (2009, p. 107).
6 This agentialst characterisation is forcefully captured in Ichikawa’s assertion that ‘‘to imagine is to
act—our imagery is an important sense under our voluntary control; this is not so with percepts’’ (108).
Ichikawa is thus rejecting epistemological and dependency theories of imagination (O’Shaughnessy 2000;
Peacocke 1985; Martin 2001) which I return to briefly in Sect. 7.
7 See, for example, Dorsch (2012, 2015).
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This distinction between mental agency and voluntary control which Ichikawa
appeals to here, and the criterion which he claims is sufficient to demarcate
involuntary dream imagery from perceptual experiences, are somewhat vague and
deserve further scrutiny and elaboration. For now, it is necessary only to state the
notable implication of Ichikawa’s model of dreaming, if this can be provided: that
dreams and dream imagery, like involuntary imaginings, are essentially agential
experiences over which we lack voluntary control; that is, whose content we can
attempt—and fail -to banish. To use Ichikawa’s terminology, dreams on this view
are like pervasive unwelcome habits or addictive episodes which we, qua agents, do
whilst asleep. They are, in virtue of being imaginative experiences, mental acts.
In virtue of endorsing these three claims, an imagination model of dreaming is
thought to have direct implications for contemporary debates in the philosophy of
mind, psychology and epistemology. Thus far, the imagination model has been
discussed primarily within the context of (ii) imaginings, and its epistemological
consequences in relation to Cartesian dream skepticism.8 However, recent
discussion has concerned the potential of the imagination model of dreaming as
an available contrast case to illuminate and motivate an analysis of the metaphysical
constitution and epistemic function of wakeful consciousness, as a crucial, relatively
neglected topic in the philosophy of mind (O’Shaughnessy 2002, 2008; Soteriou
2017; Crowther 2018). This, along with the potential of the imagination model to
serve as a guide to empirical research in the science of dreaming (providing the
much-needed conceptual clarification of the target phenomenon of this research)
offers a strong mandate for discussion into the viability of the imagination model
that Ichikawa presents and the success of the arguments offered in support of it.
3 The empirical evidence for an imagination model
3.1 Dream development in children
Whilst there is much to be said about the case for the second of Ichikawa’s central
claims—that dreaming involves taking an imaginative attitude towards the content
of our dreams—and whether the imagination model of dreaming ought to commit to
this claim, my focus here is on the arguments Ichikawa puts forward for (i) imagery,
and in particular, the empirical evidence from cognitive and behavioural psychology
he presents in favour of this thesis. Adopting an empirically-informed approach,
Ichikawa presents two psychological considerations in favour of ‘imagery’ (2009,
pp. 9–11; 2016, pp. 154–155,). The first concerns a series of long-term studies led
by David Foulkes on dream development in children in the 1960s to the 1980s. In
the first extensive longitudinal study of dreams (1982)—later documented and
8 Indeed, this is the primary motivation for Ichikawa’s (2009, 104, 2016; pp. 157–158) and Sosa’s (2005)
presentations of the view. Here, the initial proposal is that taking an imaginative, as opposed to doxastic,
attitude towards the content of our dreams provides the proponent of the imagination model with a
compelling response to dream skepticism. For a more extensive discussion of the prospects for dream
skepticism in this context however see Soteriou (2017) and Ichikawa (2008).
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analysed in his influential book ‘Children’s Dreaming and the Development of
Consciousness’ (1999)—Foulkes and his team analysed dream report data collected
over 5 years from children aged 3–15 in conjunction with performing a variety of
cognitive and personality tests. Their findings, based on reports systematically
collected in the lab and at home over a 5 year period, were radical. In addition to
consistently supporting the claim that young children and infants lack the capacity
to dream—the leading scientific and folk hypothesis at the time—the results
indicated that dreaming is a high level cognitive process which develops discretely
over time in accordance with a number of identifiable stages. In addition to tracking
changes in the frequency of dreams reported, these stages also mark discrete
differences in dream content throughout childhood development which correspond
to the type and quality of dream imagery, narration and active self representation.9
Here, Ichikawa cites the following observation from Foulkes’ in support of the
imagination model:
From all my data, the suggestion is that dreaming best reflects the
development of a specific cognitive competence, indexed by certain kinds
of tests of visual-spatial imagination, leading to the conclusion that
imagination must be a critical skill in dream-making (1999, p. 90 italics
added).10
That is, that children’s visuospatial skills—which he and his team tested via tasks
typically thought to require visual imagery and spatial imagination—was the only
waking cognitive variable which correlated with, and developed alongside, high
dream frequency and richness across the study.
3.2 The neuropsychology of dreams
The second set of studies Ichikawa presents in favour of imagery moves to cement
this neuropsychological connection between dreaming and imaginative abilities in
children to adults. Here, Ichikawa draws heavily on the work of neuroscientist Mark
Solms, whose systematic review of the empirical literature on dream abnormali-
ties—the first of its kind—and subsequent clinico-anatomical study of dreams, is
presented in ‘The Neuropsychology of Dreams’ (1997). Investigating dreaming
under neuropathological conditions, Solms aimed to identify changes in dreaming
systematically associated with focal cerebral pathology and to describe their clinical
and anatomical characteristics. In conjunction with his study of 361 neurological
patients, Solms identifies four broad categories of dream abnormalities: those in
which patients report (a) a global cessation of dreaming (b) the cessation or
9 These were later confirmed in Foulkes’ cross-sectional study (1999, p. 116).
10 Dream frequency and rich dream content did not correlate for example with increased verbal or
memory skills, which seems to repudiate the alternative hypothesis available viz. that dreams in younger
children and infants were occurring frequently yet were forgotten or not reported due to poor linguistic or
recall abilities. See Foulkes (1999, 1996), and, for a nice discussion of the methodological issues raised
here, Sutton (2009, pp. 532–536) and Rosen (2019, p. 2.2.5).
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reduction of visual imagery in dreams (c) increased frequency or vividness of
dreams (dream-reality confusion) and (d) recurring nightmares.
According to Ichikawa, Solms’ research provides empirical support for the
imagination model of dreaming. This is based on the following finding on the
behavioural correlates of (b): in cases in which a cessation in visual dream imagery
was reported, the same patients reported a further cessation of waking visual
imagery or, in cases in which dream imagery was reduced as opposed to absent, that
their waking imagery was analogously deficient (74, 93–102, 228).11 Ichikawa
maintains that such cases provide a useful means of testing the empirical credibility
of the account of dreaming he defends: ‘‘Considering patients with brain damage
resulting in imaginative deficits is particularly illuminating: such subjects tend to
exhibit precisely analogous deficits in dreaming’’ (2016, p. 254). Insofar as this
study and similar work (Solms and Turnbull 2002) appear to support a structural
connection between dreaming and imagination, Ichikawa concludes that these, in
conjunction with the conceptual arguments he presents (2009, pp. 108–109),
provide a compelling case in support of imagery, and by extension, his imagination
model of dreaming.
There is more to be said about these two empirical considerations and their
relation to Ichikawa’s central thesis. For my purposes, the important feature of
Ichikawa’s discussion here is the methodological commitment it highlights. In
drawing on these psychological considerations to support his imagination model of
dreaming in the manner just described, Ichikawa commits himself to the claim that
neuropsychological findings about the neural basis of dreaming and mental imagery
serve as important test cases for philosophical accounts of dreams. That is, a natural
redescription of Ichikawa’s reasoning here is as follows: support and accommo-
dation of empirical cases like these—specifically, cases in which waking
imaginative capacities are reduced or impaired—is an important desideratum on
an adequate philosophical theory of dreams.12 The aim in the following sections is
not to argue against this claim—it is widely accepted—but rather to argue that this
methodological commitment, in the context of a new imagery generation disorder,
provides reason to reject one of Ichikawa’s central claims, and thus turn Ichikawa’s
psychological case on its head.
4 Aphantasia and dreaming
The psychological case serving as the focus of this paper is the contemporary
rediscovery of a particularly pure case of imagery generation disorder known as
‘aphantasia’ (Zeman et al. 2010, 2015, 2016, 2018).13 Whilst it is well known that
11 Notably, and unacknowledged by Ichikawa, out of an effective sample of 186 patients only two
reported a cessation or restriction of visual dream imagery, leading Solms to conclude that the presence of
this disorder in the neurological population was very low (1.1%). I return to this point below.
12 Where this is understood as an inference to the best explanation (Lipton 2003).
13 Previous documentation of aphantasia include Galton (1880), Charcot (1889), James (1980), Faw
(2009) and Solms (1997) who refers to a similar condition known as ‘irreminiscence’.
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introspective reports regarding the vividness of mental imagery vary significantly
amongst groups of individuals (McKelvie 1995; Phillips 2014), aphantasia is
characterised by subjects—‘aphantasics’—who typically describe themselves as not
just as having mental imagery of a reduced vividness, or impaired capacities for
mental imagery generation limited to certain visual kinds, but as lacking the
capacity to generate (typically visual) mental imagery altogether.14 The work on
aphantasia, mental imagery and their neural bases is ongoing (Dawes et al. 2020;
Winlove et al. 2018; Fulford et al. 2018), however, the condition has been
documented in a series of recent studies (Zeman et al. 2010, 2015) which aim to
identify its central neurobehavioural features.15 Produced as part of ‘The Eye’s
Mind’ AHRC Project at the Medical School at the University of Exeter, the first
examines a form of imagery generation disorder exemplified in a single patient—
MX—who lost the ability to generate visual imagery abruptly, aged 65, four days
after a coronary angioplasty (see Zeman et al. 2010). As part of the study, MX was
subject to extensive psychometric testing in which he fell well within the normal
range and tested negative for further cognitive deficits. What was surprising
however, and served as the focus of this first study of aphantasia, was MX’s normal
performance on a range of visuo-spatial tests, typically thought to require conscious
experience of mental imagery.16
In response to the publication of MX’s case in the popular press (Zimmer 2010),
a growing number of people have reported recognising MX’s condition as a
lifelong, as opposed to acquired, impairment.17 In the follow up study, Zeman and
colleagues examine and describe the main neurobehavioural features of this
congenital, life-long form of aphantasia (2015, 2016). Studying a group of 21
subjects who reported similar imagery deficits to MX’s, the features of aphantasia
were elicited via completion of the well documented Vividness of Visual Imagery
Questionnaire (VVIQ).18 In addition to the expected finding that aphantasic subjects
rated significantly lower on VVIQ scores compared 121 controls (see Fig. 1), the
main finding was that aphantasic subjects, whilst reporting a sustained incapacity for
imagery generation, nevertheless reported experience of involuntary mental
imagery. This was evidenced both through the reported experience of wakeful
involuntary flashbacks, such as unwanted visual images or earworms (48%) but
also, crucially, in the dream reports of aphantasic subjects, 81% of whom reported
14 Aphantasia thus understood is an imagery generation disorder (Farah 1984) distinguishable from
visual memory disorders and visual agnosias (Zeman et al. 2015).
15 A larger systematic study of the experimental and neuropsychological features is currently being
undertaken which will add to this data (Zeman, correspondence).
16 Taking an explanation of so-called ‘blind imagination’ as its focus, the study found that MX adopted
different cognitive strategies from control subjects when performing these tasks. This has direct
consequences for the long-standing ‘imagery’ debate (see Zeman et al. 2015; 153) which I do not discuss
here.
17 Zeman et al. (2018) report 11,000 individual cases of extreme imagination (including aphantasia and
hyperaphantasia—characterised by comparably high VVIQ scores, see below).
18 Marks (1973). See the supplementary materials online http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2015.05.019.
Aphantasia is operationally defined as performance of 16/81 on this scale (Zeman, correspondence).
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rich visual dreams.19 This led the authors to the following conclusion: that there is a
‘‘significant dissociation between voluntary and involuntary forms of mental
imagery (p\ .01 McNemar Test)’’ (379, italics added). This is reflected in the
author’s previous discussion of patient MX who, while initially reporting a
permanent loss of imagery generation, nevertheless regained the capacity to
experience involuntary flashbacks as well as visual dream content within the same
time period (2010;146-7). Here, Zeman et al. make a similar conjecture:
The initial loss of and subsequent recovery of dreaming in MX while
voluntary imagery remained impaired, suggest that these two forms of
imagery involve partially but incompletely overlapping neural networks,
which is plausible in both cognitive and neural terms (154).
5 The case against Ichikawa’s imagination model
As previously stated, Ichikawa’s imagination model of dreaming is made up of three
key components which jointly amount to the claim that dreams involve instances of
agential sensory mental imagery as essential and constitutive components. This
commits the proponent of Ichikawa’s imagination model to the following: that to
Fig. 1 Distribution of VVIQ scores among aphantasic subjects and control participants (Zeman et al.
2015, p. 379)
19 Other notable findings include reported difficulties with autobiographical memory (68%) and low
effects on mood. This main finding with respect to visual dreaming and aphantasic subjects has recently
been confirmed in a follow up study of the cognitive profile of aphantasia (Dawes et al. 2020). Here again,
it was found that aphantasic individuals retain a capacity for rich visual dreaming, despite reporting
dreams less frequently than control subjects. I return to this latter finding in the final section.
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the extent that any given dream has visual content at all, this can be accounted for
solely in terms of such agential sensory mental imagery.20 In light of this, the
problem that dream reports of aphantasic subjects raise for this view is
straightforward. Faced with a description of aphantasic subjects—characterised in
the congenital form as lacking the capacity to generate visual mental imagery in any
agential capacity from birth—an imagination model of dreaming as outlined above
would predict that these subjects would have dreams with little or no visual content.
That is, if aphantasic subjects are correctly described as lacking the capacity to
experience visual mental imagery when waking, and we grant Ichikawa’s claims
that (i), per imagery, visual dream content is to be understood as an instance of this
kind of wake-type experience and (ii) per the methodological assumption raised by
the psychological case, that this ought to be reflected in empirical case studies—
then we should expect that subjects with congenital aphantasia would report similar
deficits with regard to the visual imagery experienced when dreaming. However, the
findings of the current aphantasia studies go against this, providing evidence of
multiple cases in which subjects report a sustained, lifelong loss of waking imagery
whilst the capacity for rich visual dreaming is retained. The preliminary studies thus
seem to disconfirm Ichikawa’s theory, and in doing so, problematically lend support
to alternative accounts which do not make such predictions (such as the
hallucination model of dreaming) which the imagination model was meant to
replace.
A similar pattern emerges on examination of acquired aphantasia in patient MX.
Whilst initially MX’s dream reports seem to accord with the predictions made by
the imagination model viz. that a sustained loss in the generation and experience of
visual mental imagery would be accompanied by a parallel reduction in visual
dream content, the long term finding that MX regained the capacity for visual
dreams and involuntary imagery without also regaining the former (in conjunction
with the dream reports of congenital subjects) provides an explanatory burden for
the proponent of the imagination model of dreaming: If the imagination model of
dreaming is correct, why is it that aphantasic subjects, who lack the capacity to
generate and exercise agency over their visual mental imagery, are able to have
dreams with visual content?
The empirical challenge that individuals with aphantasia and their dream reports
raise for Ichikawa’s imagination model relies on the acceptance of four broad
claims:
1. Subjects with aphantasia lack the agential capacity to generate and consciously
experience sensory mental imagery.
20 That is not to say that Ichikawa isn’t entitled to claim that there are non-visual (tactile, auditory etc.)
forms of mental imagery involved in dreams, nor that there cannot be dreams devoid of visual content.
This is only to say that, to the extent that they do, these can be accounted for solely in terms of visual
mental imagery generation. If the visual content were to be accounted for only partly by imagery and in
part by other kinds of experience, this would result in a version of a pluralist thesis. I take it that, as a
variety of a ‘reductive’ account of dreams (Rosen 2012), the proponent of the imagination model is
opposed to this latter claim.
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2. Visual imagery in dreams is to be understood and accounted for solely in terms
of imagery of this kind.
3. Dream reports accurately reflect dream experience such that aphantasic dreams
are correctly described as having visual content.
4. An adequate ontology of dreams must have the resources to account for
empirical considerations similar to those raised by the dream reports of
aphantasics.
If the challenge—namely, that recent empirical studies provide psychological
consideration better accommodated by rival accounts of dreams—is to be deflected
then one of these claims must be rejected.
A full assessment of the arguments for and against these claims, and the
underlying methodological principles these depend upon, goes well beyond the
scope of this paper. However, (1) reflects an uncontroversial claim regarding what
the VVIQ studies of subjects with aphantasia confirm, along with a plausible
assumption about the general nature of introspection (a claim which, it should be
stressed, is relied upon in much of contemporary consciousness science).21 (2) as
discussed, follows from the endorsement of Ichikawa’s imagination model of
dreaming. This leaves the proponent of Ichikawa’s imagination model with the
possibility of rejecting claims (3) or (4). In addition to the fact that both enjoy broad
acceptance in the surrounding literature, and thus whose rejection would require
significant independent argument, the more pertinent problem for Ichikawa when
faced with the prospect of rejecting these claims is that both are relied upon in the
existing psychological and—in the case of (3)—conceptual arguments Ichikawa
utilises in order to motivate the position to begin with.22 As discussed at the end of
3.2, Ichikawa’s endorsement of his psychological case conveys a commitment to the
claim that it is an expectation of philosophical accounts of dreams that they are
supported by, or at least able to accommodate, empirical cases like these. As such,
the rejection of (3) or (4) comes at a great cost to Ichikawa, in removing or
significantly weakening the case for the position that we started with. Collectively,
the discussion here can be seen as resulting in the following dilemma for the
proponent of the imagination model: to either claim that these kinds of empirical
considerations are irrelevant to discussions of dream ontology—on the basis of
denying either (3) or (4)—and thus abandon the previous psychological case in
favour of the model, or grant instead that aphantasia constitutes a compelling
empirical case which alternative models of dreaming can better accommodate.
21 The claim also has empirically plausibility—see Keogh and Pearson (2018). Pearson and Keogh
attempt to refute an alternative explanation for congenital aphantasia according to which aphantasia
results from poor metacognition as opposed to a visual imagery deficit (that is, that aphantasic subjects do
have visual images in their minds but are in some sense ‘blind’ to them). They conclude that congenital
aphantasia is correctly characterised as a disorder of visual/sensory mental imagery, and I grant this here.
22 See Windt (2010, 2013, 2015) and Windt and Metzinger (2007) for an independent defense of the
reliability of dream reports in ideal conditions. Denial of (4) is also independently implausible for several
reasons, the most notable of which concerns the recent debate over the methodology of metaphysics and
its relationship to science (see Paul 2012). On this view, accommodation of empirical considerations
would not be a mere or optional virtue of competing theories of dreams, but is in fact demanded by
acceptance of the claim that the metaphysics of mind proceeds via inference to the best explanation.
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Could a proponent of Ichikawa’s theory not object here that (2) does not follow
from Ichikawa’s theory, given his claim that dream imagery results from the
exercise of a type of mental agency which does not require voluntary control? That
is, that the imagination model is not committed to the claim that visual dream
mentation is to be accounted for solely in terms of the sort of mental imagery which
is lacking in the aphantasaic case? The lack of elaboration and defense of this
account of mental agency as that which is subject to the will—and the criterion of
‘making sense to try to banish’ which is meant to account for it—makes it difficult
to respond to this line of argument.23 However, an objection to this line of response
can be raised which targets the independent plausibility of Ichikawa’s voluntary-
involuntary agency distinction and its ability to secure an agentialist theory of
imagination (and thus, the appeal to this distinction in response to this challenge).
This results from the following: any agentialist account which aims to accommodate
dreams and involuntary imaginative episodes requires a notion of agency which is
(i) weak enough to not rule out dreams and involuntary imaginings as bona fide
instances of imagination and (ii) is simultaneously robust such as to be sufficient to
distinguish involuntary imaginings from other typical non-agential mental phe-
nomena (perception, hallucinations etc.). The worry then, simply stated, is that it is
not obvious that Ichikawa is successful in providing such an account. That is, one
might think that it is neither clear that the voluntary-involuntary distinction is weak
enough to secure dreams within its purview (how plausible is it, for example, that
dreams are really things that we do involuntarily?) nor that the ‘making sense to
attempt to banish’ criterion is sufficient to distinguish between instances of
involuntary imagination from other mental phenomena (does it not similarly make
sense to attempt to banish hallucinatory experiences?). As such, the objection goes,
appeal to this account here is unwarranted. In the absence of further elucidation and
defense of this notion of agency, Ichikawa’s claim collapses into the thesis
described in (2).24
The foregoing argument can thus be seen as presenting a dilemma for proponents
of Ichikawa’s theory, resulting from a distinction between a strong and weak view
of the relationship between mental agency and visual imagery in dreams. That is,
either the proponent of the imagination model of dreaming can claim that notion of
agency at play here is strong—being comparable to that which is lacking in subjects
with aphantasia—which leaves Ichikawa vulnerable to the empirical challenge, or
the relevant notion of agency is weak. While this deflationary analysis may avoid
the empirical challenge, this account—grounded in the notion of agency as that
23 See Ichikawa (2009, pp. 107, 116).
24 I return to this objection in the final section, where I suggest an empirical means of testing its viability.
However, it is worth noting here that one might think that concerns remain even if a relevant notion of
agency can be conceptually secured. For example, one might argue that the ‘‘significant dissociation
between voluntary and involuntary forms of mental imagery’’ Zeman et al. report (2015, p. 379) places
significant pressure on Ichikawa’s claim that involuntary forms of imagery shares and inherits the
agential nature of the voluntary imaginings which drives agential accounts of imagination. At the very
least, this raises a question for Ichikawa: if recent empirical data pushes us to accept a view on which
voluntary and involuntary imagery are, to a large extent, neurally distinct, why think that the claim that
involuntary imagination shares the agential nature of voluntary imagination remains a plausible one?
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which is ‘subject to the will’—leaves the proponent of Ichikawa’s view of dreaming
with a theory of imagination which lacks independent plausibility; being unable to
satisfy the independent requirements on an adequate philosophical theory of
imagination. Either way, the argument goes, this model of dreaming ought to be
rejected.25
6 An inactive imagination model of dreaming
Are there other alternatives open to the proponent of the imagination model of
dreaming? I have argued that the dream reports of aphantasic subjects pose a
problem for Ichikawa’s model of dreaming insofar as Ichikawa is committed to the
claim (2) that dreams essentially involve, or constitute instances of, experiences of
agential forms of sensory mental imagery. That is, visual mental imagery which is
in an important sense under our agential control. This follows as a consequence of
Ichikawa’s characterisation and individuation of imagination more broadly, as that
which is necessarily subject to the will. Recent literature however suggests that
Ichikawa’s formulation is not the only way of characterising the imagination model
of dreaming. Here, I argue that the best response to the case studies presented in
Sect. 2 for a proponent of an imagination model of dreaming is to reject thesis (2)
above in favour of a modified claim. This allows the proponent of this model to
avoid the dilemma just presented and retain the psychological case Ichikawa
outlines in favour of an imagination model of dreaming.26
Motivated by the need to provide a philosophical analysis of the state of wakeful
consciousness, as an explanatorily preeminent condition relative to non-wake states,
the alternative account of dreaming receiving attention in recent literature starts
from an analysis of the wakeful condition as necessitating a kind of practical self-
25 Here the following thought may arise. It is commonly held that the capacity for visual dreaming can be
preserved in blind subjects if eyesight is lost after the age of 7 years. Does adherence to this argument
against Ichikawa’s model of dreaming also commit one to an analogous argument with respect to
hallucination models of dreaming—that is, commit one to the claim that empirical findings about the
dream reports of blind subjects similarly threaten theories which state that dreams are essentially percept-
involving hallucinations? This is an interesting line of thought. It does, however, elicit an obvious line of
response on behalf of the hallucination theorist, which suggests a negative answer to this question. This
takes as its basis the well-known distinction between ‘perception’ (as implicated in blindness) and the
wider category of ‘visual experience’. Here, the thought is that, unlike the case of aphantasia and sensory
imagination, the fact that one’s capacity to visually perceive has been disabled (in blindness) does not
entail that the subject in question cannot undergo visual experiences of any sort, because these are,
crucially, two distinct phenomena. That is, there are percept-involving visual experiences—namely,
hallucinations—which are not (according to most theories) perceptions. The hallucination theorist can
thus accommodate this finding via a line of argument which is unavailable to the imagination theorist, as
there is no obvious, analogous distinction in the case of sensory imagination and aphantasia. Thank you to
an anonymous reviewer for bringing my attention to this issue.
26 A note of clarification: the suggestion in this paper is not that this inactive imagination model of
dreaming is incontrovertibly correct. That is, I do not take myself to present an adequate defense of this
view here. Rather, the claim is that there is—pending further work (and examination of the arguments for
it presented in the cited articles below)—a viable response to the empirical challenge which can be taken
up by the proponent of the imagination model.
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knowledge which results from the exercise of autonomous mental agency
(O’Shaughnessy 2000, 2002).27 According to this analysis, the constitutive
difference between wakeful and non-wakeful conditions (in this case, dreaming)
is given in terms of the (in)capacity to exercise agency over our mental lives—that
is, a capacity or ability to perform mental actions—which, it is claimed, is
responsible for enabling the distinctive and immediate sort of self-knowledge
(knowledge of ‘what we are up to’) characteristic of wakeful consciousness
(Soteriou 2017, Crowther 2018).28 In O’Shaughnessy’s words (2002;426, see also
Soteriou 2017) the suggestion here is that ‘‘Consciousness [wakeful consciousness]
necessitates an overall mental activeness, for the reason that the conscious [i.e. the
awake] are in control of the overall movement of their own minds, and the dream is
an essentially inactive phenomenon’’ (emphasis added).
How does this help the imagination theorist with respect to dreaming? From this
analysis of wakeful consciousness, a general claim regarding the nature of dreaming
follows: that dreaming involves the temporary incapacitation of our ability to
exercise mental agency. It is thus an ‘essentially inactive’ phenomenon. When
combined with (i) imagery, this provides us with the following:
(2*) dreaming essentially involves instances of passive, non-agential forms of
imagination.29
This is usually combined with the further claim that the episodes of inactive or non-
voluntary imagining constitutive of dreaming are characterised by an appearance or
illusion of being mentally active. Soteriou (2017) sums the proposal as follows: ‘‘In
short, [in the dream state] one suffers from a sort of mental paralysis—a form of
mental paralysis that doesn’t even allow for the possibility of failed attempts to
exercise agency over one’s thinking. But it is a form of mental paralysis that is
accompanied by the illusion of agency—the illusion of seeming to affirm, seeming
to judge seeming to decide, seeming to be mentally active (13; emphasis added).
Insofar as this model rejects Ichikawa’s characterisation of imagination as
necessarily subject to the will, the alternative account of the imagination model of
dreaming is not committed to the central claim of Ichikawa’s account viz. that
dreams constitutively involve the same form of agential imagination which is
lacking in the aphantasia subjects. Given that on this model, the capacity to imagine
27 See O’Shaughnessy (2000), Crowther (2018) for an explanation of this connection in terms of the
‘internal intelligibility’ of the stream of consciousness.
28 This is meant to be neutral with regard to whether this claim is to be accounted for solely in terms of
dispositions of agency or broadly in terms of differences in general capacitation not limited to mental
agency (Crowther 2018). The latter claim is all that is required.
29 See the aforementioned articles for discussion of this account, which is proposed as a theory of non-
lucid dreams. That is, in order to account for lucid dreams (see later) this view is usually accompanied by
the claim that dreaming—and sleep mentation generally—is a non-unitary phenomenon which allows for
hybrid states of consciousness (Voss and Hobson 2014; Bayne et al. 2016; Howhy and Bayne et al. 2016).
That is, they claim that ‘‘during lucid dreams, the dreaming subject becomes aware that the events she is
imagining are not real, and this is precisely because at that point during sleep the subject’s ability to
exercise agency over her mental life is reinstated, albeit in a limited, degraded form’’ (Soteriou 2017,
p. 12). I leave it open whether this argument is ultimately successful.
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and the capacity to exercise agency over our mental lives comes apart, it allows for
and, to the extent that it defines dreaming in terms of this incapacity for mental
agency, predicts that agents who lack the capacity to perform mental acts with
regard to visual imagination (namely, aphantasic subjects) may nevertheless retain
the capacity to visually dream. The implication of this claim should be obvious: on
this variation of the imagination model—where (2) is replaced with (2*)—the
empirical challenge raised by aphantasia fails to hold.
As this amounts to a rejection of Ichikawa’s (iii) claim—namely, his agentialist
theory of imagination—proponents of the inactive imagination model need to
supplement this account of dreaming with an alternative theory of imagination
which, as stated earlier, can adequately account for the various desiderata on
contemporary philosophical accounts of imagination.30 While the foregoing
argument depends on the availability of such an account, it also serves a broader
purpose—highlighting the role and dialectical importance of philosophical theories
of imagination in the recent debate over dreams which has previously been under-
appreciated.
7 Suggestions for future research
7.1 Extreme imagination and competing theories of dreams
Thus far, I have been considering the implications that the dream reports of subjects
with aphantasia have for Ichikawa’s agentialist imagination theory of dreaming. But
what, if any, is the broader theoretical significance of these findings for the
philosophy and science of consciousness? This section includes a discussion of two
proposals which serves to situate the recent studies of aphantasia in the wider
context. Turning first to the implications of the foregoing discussion of the
philosophy of mind and consciousness. Assessing these requires us to answer the
following questions: first, how does the empirical challenge I present against an
active imagination model and in favour of inactive account of dreaming relate to the
previous empirical considerations Ichikawa offers in support of an imagination
model of dreaming? Are the results from the aphantasia studies and those from
Solms’ and Foulkes’ studies on dream development and dream pathology
congruous—that is, do they, when considered together, provide a strong case for
an inactive imagination model of dreaming, or are they instead suggestive of a more
disparate evidential picture? Second and relatedly, we are now in a position to ask
how the empirical considerations raised by aphantasia relate to alternative theses
concerning the ontological constitution of dreams. In the previous section, I argued
that the empirical argument based on dream reports of aphantasia could be offset if
30 Recent literature suggests that this ought to be supplemented by a dependency theory of imagination,
which provides an analysis of imagination in terms of their phenomenal resemblance and ontic
dependency on perceptual experiences (Martin 2002; Peacocke 1985; Soteriou 2013; cf. Nanay 2016;
Noordhof 2002). However, it seems that an epistemological account of imagination (O’Shaughnessy
2000; Sartre 1940) would serve the imagination theorist just as well here.
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an inactive imagination theory of dreaming was endorsed, but can this particular
empirical consideration do any further positive work in this context? In other words,
what does the finding that aphantasic subjects have visual dreams mean for
competing analyses of dreams?
At first glance, there seems to be a tension between Ichikawa’s psychological
case for the imagination model and the dream reports of aphantasics discussed here.
This arises as a result of Solms’ clinico-anatomical study of dream pathologies
described in Sect. 3.2. There, to recall, Solms reported that patients with dream
pathologies in which visual dream imagery was lost describe precisely analogous
deficits in waking visual imagery (Solms 1997, pp. 93–102, Ichikawa 2016, p. 254).
Insofar as the dream reports of aphantasics constitute multiple cases in which
waking visual imagery is lost while dream visual imagery is retained, these results
appear to be in tension with this new data; thus, when considered collectively, these
appear to be suggestive of a disparate evidential picture with respect to the thesis
that dreams constitutively involve instances of sensory imagination.
This initial impression is, however, misleading. Interestingly—and unacknowl-
edged by Ichikawa—out of the effective sample of 186 patients Solms examined,
only two reported a cessation or restriction of visual dream imagery (and the parallel
loss of visual waking imagery), leading Solms to the early conclusion that the
presence of this particular dream disorder in the neurological population was very
low (1.1%). The small number of patients examined constitute an obvious, and
previously unnoted, limitation to Ichikawa’s psychological argument. Nonetheless,
this feature of the study provides a means of rendering Solms’ results compatible
with Zeman et al.’s finding that 81% of the aphatnasics studied report rich visual
dreams. That is, Zeman et al.’s finding here is consistent with the correlational data
Solms reports in his study, in which it is acknowledged that this applies only to a
small number of patients. Instead of opposing Solms’ research findings, the dream
report data of aphantasics can thus be seen as a welcome addition to Solms’ early
results on visual imagery dream disorders and its relation to waking visual imagery
deficiencies, demonstrating that the correlational pattern Solms describes is
characteristic of exceptions to aphantasic cases and not the norm.31
Turning now to the second question. What significance, if any, does the finding
that aphantasic subjects have visual dreams have for competing analyses of dreams?
A number of more comprehensive studies on aphantasia and other forms of extreme
imagination are currently underway. Thus far, these studies on extreme imagination
are suggestive of a number of notable findings. Most importantly, they reveal that a
positive correlation holds between both (i) the absence of waking visual imagery
and loss of dream imagery and (ii) the presence of hyperaphantasia and particularly
31 What explains these cases? Should we not expect that all aphantasics lack visual dream imagery? The
imagination proponent owes us an explanation here. One suggestion—open to future empirical
confirmation—is that the terms ‘aphantasia’ and ‘hyperaphantasia’ do not represent binary categories but
are best understood as poles on an imagery vividness continuum (a hypothesis supported by McKelvie
1995 as well as a recent study on individual differences in aphantasic subjects from Dawes et al. 2020).
The suggestion then is that those aphantasics reporting no visual dream imagery fall at the extreme end of
this spectrum, while those reporting visual dream imagery correspond to more ‘moderate’ forms of
aphantasia.
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vivid visual dreams, compared to normal controls.32 When considered in conjunc-
tion with the main finding of Zeman et al. discussed in this paper, this places an
explanatory burden on alternative prominent theories of dreams—such as the
hallucination (Hobson 1988) and recent sui-generis theories (Windt 2010; 2015):
why, if there is no tight ontological connection between dream mentation and
sensory imagination, as these theories maintain, are subjects with aphantasia more
likely than those with average or vivid imagery to report absence or reduction of
visual dreaming? Answering this question and collecting further data which sheds
light on its viability, is the next obvious step for philosophers working on dreams
who aim to provide satisfactory and empirically adequate solutions to the
conceptualisation problem.
7.2 Aphantasia and lucid dreaming: a testable empirical hypothesis
An obvious datum for any conceptual theory of dreaming, and one which is
pertinent to the issues discussed in this paper, is the phenomenon of lucid
dreaming—dreams in which subjects become aware that they are dreaming and, in
some cases, are able to manipulate and control their dream content (La Berge 2004;
Voss et al. 2009). Insofar they provide opportunities in which subjects can reflect,
introspect and subsequently report the content of their dreams in greater detail,
experimental paradigms investigating lucid dreams continue to be at the forefront of
empirical dream research.33 As an agentive state of consciousness, in which a
subject’s capacity for mental agency is clearly retained in some form, lucid dreams
also play an important role in motivating Ichikawa’s agentialist account of the
imagination theory, and serve as an obvious counterexample to the inactive
imagination model of dreaming.34 In addition to this initial role however, the
rediscovery of aphantasia presents lucid dream research with a further empirical
function. When lucid dreaming is considered in the context of the recent studies of
aphantasics and their visual dream reports, the following question arises: can
subjects with aphantasia also lucid dream in a visual sense? Currently, no cases of
lucid dreaming in subjects with aphantasia have been reported.35 However, the
32 Dawes et al. (2020) and Zeman (correspondence).
33 Voss et al. (2018); Windt and Voss (2018) Saunders et al. (2016) include recent meta-analyses and
summaries of this work. Here, lucid dreams are characterised by the three dissociable features : (i) the
presence of subject insight (a conscious awareness that one is dreaming) (ii) control (manipulation of
dream content and narrative) and dissociation from one’s dream experience (such as seeing the dream as
if it were playing on a screen, or viewing one’s self from the outside).
34 Ichikawa (2009, pp. 116–117). See footnote 28 for a discussion of lucid dreaming and the inactive
account of dreaming which involves the hypothesis that lucid dreaming is a hybrid phenomenon (Voss
et al. 2018; Soteriou 2017).
35 Zeman (correspondence). It would also be useful to conduct further dream studies of aphantasics who
don’t lucid dream. That is, the following question also appears to be empirically testable: do subjects with
aphantasia report an ability to attempt to banish—in Ichikawa’s sense—their visual imagery whilst
dreaming? This would, if the finding is negative, lend greater support to the argument presented above.
Whilst research on the phenomenology and sense of agency in dreams is currently in early stages (see
Rosen 2015 for a review), this presents a promising line of work for future research.
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availability and empirical examination of such cases could greatly improve,—or,
alternatively, weaken—the case in favour of the inactive imagination model of
dreaming presented in this paper. That is, if it found that aphantasic subjects
generally report an inability to lucid dream this would—on the assumption that the
capacity to (or otherwise learn how to) lucid dreaming is generally available in
typical samples of the population—lend empirical support to the thesis that dreams
constitutively involve inactive forms of imagination.36 Conversely, if aphantasia
subjects generally retain the capacity for lucid dreaming (relative to its uptake and
presence in control groups)—and those lucid dreams contain visual content—the
inactive imagination model would—on the assumption that dreams are homoge-
neous in nature- be empirically disconfirmed. This potential to facilitate further
empirical work, along with the philosophical applications discussed in the previous
section imbues aphantasia with a wider theoretical significance in the context of the
conceptualisation problem which goes beyond the repudiation of Ichikawa’s theory
of dreaming, and provides philosophers and psychologists with an exciting new
avenue of dream research.
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36 Early support for this claim is found in a recent study on aphantasia from Dawes et al. (2020), who
report that ‘aphantasic individuals also reported experiencing lower awareness and control during their
dreams [compared to control subjects]’ (6). The most relevant phenomenon here of course are lucid
dreams in which the subject is able to control and manipulate her visual dream imagery to some degree
(whether or not lucid dreams where insight is present but not control could be included in this sort of
study will largely depend upon the—currently open question—of know exactly insight should be
understood, especially with respect to mental agency—Voss 2016; Kühle 2014). While control of this
kind is less frequent in the ‘naturally occurring’ lucid dreams found mostly in adolescents (Voss et al.
2012; Voss and Hobson 2014) there is currently good evidence that control-involving lucid dreaming in
adults is a learnable skill or ability which can be improved with practice (La Berge 2007; Schredl and
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